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DEFENDING THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S HARD-LOOK REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Although corporate governance is predominately a state law issue, many
corporations are subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) because they either are publicly traded, trade in
securities, or do both. As a result, these companies are affected by corporate
governance and other rules promulgated by the SEC. It should not be
surprising then that organizations challenge these rules when they dislike the
substance of the rules or how they were promulgated. For the past decade,
some organizations have been successful in challenging SEC rules under the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act1 of 1996 (“NSMIA”). In one of
the more recent cases, a group of organizations successfully challenged a rule
promulgated by the SEC that would have given shareholders in every state
access to the nomination process for directors in publicly held corporations.2
However, these successes have attracted criticism from legal scholars who
allege that the court deciding the cases, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, has usurped the SEC’s rulemaking authority.3
I. A HARD LOOK AT HARD-LOOK REVIEW
For nearly sixty-two years the SEC’s rulemaking authority was constrained
by just two requirements.4 The SEC was required to promulgate rules that were
“necessary or appropriate in the public interest” and, when it did so, it was
required to consider whether the rule would promote the “protection of
investors.”5 However, in 1996 Congress amended the securities laws that form
the backbone of the SEC’s authority6 when it enacted the NSMIA.7 The
NSMIA added the requirement that “whenever . . . the [SEC] is engaged in
1 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 3416,
15 U.S.C. § 78a note.
2 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146–47 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
3 See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C.
Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1818 (2012).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2014); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f),
15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2014); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2014).
7 110 Stat. 3416, 15 U.S.C. § 78a note.
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rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the [SEC] shall also consider, in
addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”8 Congress left undefined
“consider,” “efficiency,” “competition,” and “capital formation.”9
The actions of all federal agencies are subject to review under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)10 and the respective agency’s enabling
statute. When the SEC promulgates a rule or issues a final order and that rule
or order is challenged, it is often reviewed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”). Since Congress
enacted the NSMIA, the SEC has endured a string of successful challenges to
its rules in the D.C. Circuit.11 In each of these challenges, the D.C. Circuit held
that the SEC had not properly considered the rule’s economic effects.12
The SEC’s series of defeats in the D.C. Circuit have not gone unnoticed by
commentators, many among whom are judges, professors, and attorneys.13
Instead of faulting the SEC’s inability to articulate the reasoning behind its
rules, some esteemed commentators have criticized the D.C. Circuit’s “HardLook review” (“Hard-Look Review”).14 These commentators (“Critics”)
believe that the D.C. Circuit has usurped the SEC’s rule making authority and,
in so doing, has acted against the will of Congress and the Supreme Court of
the United States.15 Their criticism centers on the allegation that the D.C.
Circuit goes beyond the review standard intended by Congress by requiring the
SEC to conduct a cost-benefit-analysis (“CBA”) whenever it considers the
effects of a rule on the protection of investors, efficiency, competition, and
capital formation (“Required Factors”).16 These Critics seem to believe that,
even if the D.C. Circuit does not require the SEC to do a cost benefit analysis,

8

Id.
Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1818.
10 See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 79 P.L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
11 See COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 7th ed.
2013); see also Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647
F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
12 Id. at 18.
13 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1833.
14 See generally id. at 1830.
15 See id. at 1813, 1828.
16 See id. at 1813.
9
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it is inappropriate to decide the validity of a rule based on the CBA the SEC
conducted and put forth as justification for the rule.17
Does the D.C. Circuit usurp the SEC’s rulemaking authority when it
reviews the CBA the SEC conducts when considering the Required Factors?
The short answer is “No.” A thorough reading of the D.C. Circuit cases in
question reveals that the D.C Circuit did not usurp the SEC’s rulemaking
power. This work will demonstrate that the D.C. Circuit applied well-settled
precedent and applied the proper standard of review for agency action. To that
end, this work will rely on the precedents that a rule promulgated by a federal
agency stands or falls based on the justification the agency put forth at the time
it adopted the rule18 and that ambiguity in an enabling statute is an “express
delegation” of power to an agency to interpret the ambiguity.19 To establish a
standard by which to judge the D.C. Circuit’s analysis, Part II will explain the
appropriate standard of review for agency action. Part III will discuss the
statutes at issue. Part IV will then describe the D.C. Circuit decisions called
into question and rebut the Critics’ arguments.
II. CHEVRON ANALYSIS: THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
Agency action, and the subsequent review of agency action, is governed by
the APA.20 The proper standard of review for agency action under the APA
(“Proper Standard of Review”) is derived from Supreme Court precedent in
Chevron v. NRDC,21 United States v. Mead Corp,22 Vermont Yankee v.
NRDC,23 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co,24 and
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.25
Together, these five cases set out the Proper Standard of Review for agency
action.
A court reviewing agency action applies a Chevron analysis (“Chevron
Analysis”).26 The analysis counsels courts to first ask whether Congress has
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

843.

See generally id. at 1828–29.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
See generally 60 Stat. 237.
See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See generally Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
See generally Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at
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explicitly or implicitly delegated authority to the agency to make rules with the
force of law (“Chevron Step Zero”).27 Because Congress delegates authority to
agencies under the assumption that the agency has expertise in its given area,
courts grant agencies varying levels of deference based on the specific action
taken by the agency.28 If the statute neither explicitly or implicitly delegates
such authority to the agency then it may still enjoy some “respect,”29 but it will
not receive Chevron-level deference (“Chevron Deference”).30 Only if the
statute grants the agency the authority to make rules with the force of law will
the reviewing court accord the agency Chevron Deference.31 If the statute does
grant the agency such authority, the court’s next step is to determine whether
the language of the statute is ambiguous (“Chevron Step One”).32 At this stage,
the court searches for the meaning Congress intended to give the language at
issue and will analyze the text of the statute, consult dictionaries, and,
depending on the judge, examine the legislative history of the statute.33 If
Congress’s intent is made clear by this inquiry then that is the end of the
matter; the court and the agency must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.34 However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue at hand, the court must determine whether the
agency’s interpretation was based on a permissible construction of the statue
(“Chevron Step Two”).35 Simply put, the court looks to see if the agency’s
interpretation was reasonable in light of the statute. Courts also assess the
agency’s interpretation in light of previous court decisions regarding the statute
at issue.36
27 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27 (United States v. Mead Corp. is not particularly important to
discussion that will follow because it only applies when Congress did not give an agency the authority to issue
rules with the force of law. In every case cited by the Critics the SEC was given the authority to issue rules
with the force of law).
28 See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 863, 865.
29 See Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“Skidmore Respect”).
30 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27 (Even if an agency action does not receive Chevron deference it
may still receive Skidmore Respect); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (deferring to agency interpretation so
long as it is reasonable in light of the statute at issue).
31 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27.
32 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
33 See generally id. (examining the plain meaning, meaning in context, and legislative history of the
statute).
34 Id. at 842–43.
35 See id. at 843.
36 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 984 (In Brand X the
Supreme Court complicated an agency’s ability to interpret its enabling statute differently over time. Brand X
requires a reviewing court to examine prior cases interpreting the statute at issue for a “clear” reading of the
statute. If the reviewing court should find that a previous court established a “clear” reading of the statute, the
reviewing court must give effect to that court’s interpretation of the statute).
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A reviewing court defers to the agency’s interpretation unless it is
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.”37 However, a reviewing court cannot set aside an agency rule that is
“rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors, and within the scope
of the authority delegated to agency by the statute.”38 Moreover, an agency is
afforded a high level of deference when it interprets its enabling statute.39 The
reason for the high level of deference is found within Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (“Chevron”). In Chevron, the Supreme Court held
that ambiguity in a statute is an “express delegation” of power to an agency to
define the ambiguity.40 Although it might appear that once an agency has
progressed to Chevron Step Two it enjoys smooth sailing to the finish line, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that agencies are required to support their
actions with logical reasoning.
In Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co (“State
Farm”), 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the Supreme Court offered four possible ways
that an agency’s justification for its actions would be unsatisfactory under the
arbitrary and capricious standard.41 Normally, “an agency rule would be
arbitrary or capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has
not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view of the product of the agency expertise.”42 Reviewing
courts cannot “make up for such deficiencies” because courts “may not supply
a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”43
When a reviewing court thoroughly analyzes an agency’s reasoning, it
administers “Hard Look” Judicial Review (“Hard-Look Review”).44 Under
Hard-Look Review, a court must “consider whether the decision was based on
a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment.”45 To avoid having its action ruled arbitrary and capricious, an
37

5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A).
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42.
39 See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–46.
40 Id. at 843.
41 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43.
42 Id.
43 Id. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1943)).
44 See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN.
L. REV. 753, 757 (2014).
45 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43.
38
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agency must “consider relevant factors,” articulate a “rational connection
between the facts found and the decision made,” and offer a logical
explanation for exercising its discretion.46 When a court reviews an agency
action, it is not to substitute its reasoning for that of the agency or provide
reasoning for the agency that the agency has not advanced.47 It is clear from
the Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, that an agency’s
action must stand or fall based on the reasoning provided by the agency at the
time the action was taken.48 However, in a nod to agency expertise, courts will
“uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may be
reasonably discerned.”49
The danger of Hard-Look Review is that it may allow a reviewing court to
substitute its reasoning for that of the agency. However, the potential for such a
substitution was reduced by the Supreme Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)
(“Vermont Yankee”), wherein the Court held that reviewing courts are not to
substitute their own notions of proper procedures for those of the agency they
are reviewing.50 The Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee was based on the
APA.51 Section 55352 of the APA generally establishes “the maximum
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose
upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.”53 The formulation of
procedures beyond statutory requirements is thus left to agency discretion.54
Accordingly, “agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the
exercise of their discretion.”55 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not
entirely precluded reviewing courts from imposing extra-statutory procedures
on agencies. However, the Supreme Court has given no examples of what
circumstances would “ever justify a court in overturning agency action because

46

Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
See id.
48 See id.
49 Id. (quoting Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1974)).
50 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524.
51 Id.
52 5 U.S.C. §553.
53 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524.
54 See id. at 525 (Extra-statutory procedures are left to agency discretion as a result of “the congressional
determination that administrative agencies will be . . . in a better position than federal judges or Congress itself
to design procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency involved”).
55 Id.
47

LIND GALLEYSFINAL

2016]

4/20/2016 10:59 AM

DEFENDING THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S REVIEW

177

of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by statute.”56
Whatever those circumstances are, “if they exist,” they are unknown.57
III. CONSIDER THE FACTORS
Although the primary purpose of the NSMIA was to further federalize the
public offering of securities, the Act added economic factors for the SEC to
consider when issuing rules.58 With the NSMIA, Congress imposed upon the
SEC the requirement that it “consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation” (“Amended Standard”).59 In 1999 Congress passed the GrammLeach-Bliley Act that included an amendment to the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 (“IAA”).60 This amendment moved the IAA into the same review
standard Congress had enacted in the NSMIA three years before.61 Congress
again left ambiguous “consider”, “the protection of investors”, “efficiency”,
“competition”, and “capital formation.”62 Thus, Congress once more expressly
delegated to the SEC the authority to reasonably interpret the terms.63
Because “consider” grammatically governs what level of analysis the SEC
must give to each factor, the ultimate issue is determining what Congress
meant when it used the verb. Webster’s Dictionary defines “consider” as “to
think about carefully,” “to regard or treat in an attentive or kindly way,” “to
gaze steadily or reflectively,” or “to come to judge or classify.”64 The common
thread of the definitions is deep thought. In the context of the NSMIA,
“consider” suggests that Congress intended the SEC to take into account the
economic effects of a proposed rule before promulgating it.65 The legislative
histories of the NSMIA and the IAA establish only that Congress preferred an
ambiguous standard to a precise one and that Congress intended to change at
56

Id.
Id. (the Supreme Court has not elaborated as to what these circumstances may be).
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (requiring the SEC to consider whether a proposed action will “promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation”).
59 110 Stat. 3416, 15 U.S.C. § 78a note.
60 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (1999); see also Gramm-LeachBliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 224, 113 Stat. 1338, 1402 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (2014).
61 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (incorporating the Review Standard into § 202 of the Investment Advisers Act).
62 Compare 110 Stat. 3416, with 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c).
63 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (deferring to agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
64 Consider, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consider (last
visited Feb. 14, 2016).
65 See generally 110 Stat. 3416, 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (passed in part to “provide more effective and less
burdensome regulation”).
57
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least the level of discretion the SEC enjoyed in regards to rulemaking
procedures.66 However, “[t]he Constitution gives legal effect to the ‘Laws’
Congress enacts, Art. VI, cl. 2, not the objectives its Members aimed to
achieve in voting for them.”67 Therefore, the only legislative history that
matters is the text of the statutes. The D.C. Circuit’s conduct, discussed infra,
is strong evidence that it finds the Amended Standard to be ambiguous.68 As a
result, the SEC has the authority to offer a reasonable interpretation of the
Amended Standard.69 Consequently, the SEC’s interpretation of the Amended
Standard is the only one that truly matters.70 Yet, the SEC has not explicitly
interpreted the Amended Standard and has suffered multiple defeats as a
result.71
IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S HARD-LOOK REVIEW
The Critics’ argument that the D.C. Circuit usurpation of the SEC’s
rulemaking power is built upon four D.C. Circuit cases, Public Citizen v.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“Public Citizen”),72 American
Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC (“American Equity”),73 Chamber
of Commerce of the United States v. SEC (“Chamber of Commerce”),74 and
Business Roundtable v. SEC (“Business Roundtable”).75 Critics allege that the
66 Compare Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996, S. 1815, 104th Cong. § 310 (1996) (Senate
requiring reports by the SEC’s Chief Economist), with National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(b), 110 Stat. at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2014)) (rejecting the
Senate’s precise but overly cumbersome language but mandating that the SEC perform an economic analysis
with knowledge that the SEC already performed such analyses on its own), and 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c)
(Congress did not alter the language of the Amended Standard from the NSMIA).
67 Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 302
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
68 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148 (the Court broadly states that the SEC has an “obligation to
consider the effect of a new rule ‘upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation,’” which is almost the
actual text of the Amended Standard. This suggests that the D.C. Circuit was giving the SEC the opportunity to
interpret for itself what exactly its obligation entailed.).
69 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (deferring to agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
70 See generally id.
71 See generally Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d 133 (the SEC based its defense on
the difficulty of determining costs rather than what it interpreted the Amended Standard to require); Bus.
Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (the SEC offered a cost-benefit analysis for support of its rule without stating that
the Amended Standard required it to do so); but see Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 172 (the SEC
performed an economic analysis but argued that the Amended Standard did not require it to perform a
thorough analysis).
72 See generally Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
73 See generally Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166.
74 See generally Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d 133.
75 See generally Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144.
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D.C. Circuit did not apply the Proper Standard of Review because it analyzed
the CBAs the SEC submitted as justifications for the rules being challenged.76
The argument stems from the Critics’ belief that “consider” only requires the
SEC to toss a factor back and forth without making a conclusion as to a rule’s
effect on that factor.77 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit’s opinions, discussed infra,
suggest that the SEC must at least offer a guess as to a rule’s effect before it
can truly consider that effect. To demonstrate that the D.C. Circuit has done
nothing more than perform a Chevron Analysis with Hard-Look Review, this
section will describe the cases before rebutting the Critics’ argument.
A. The Cases
In Public Citizen, 374 F.3d 1209, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a challenge to
a rule issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”)
revising limitations on the working hours of commercial motor vehicles
operators.78 FMCSA’s enabling statutes required the agency to consider,
among other things, “the impact of the rule on the health of drivers.”79
However, the FMCSA neglected to consider the impact its revision would have
on the health of the drivers as required by statute.80 As a result, the challengers
argued that the rule was arbitrary and capricious.81 The D.C. Circuit reviewed
the challenge under the standard set by State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, which
required the court to “ensure that the agency made a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.”82 Citing State Farm for the
principle that “an agency’s rule is normally arbitrary and capricious if it
entirely failed to consider and important aspect of the problem before it,” the
D.C. Circuit held that the revision was arbitrary and capricious.83 The D.C.
Circuit reasoned that “[a] statutorily mandated factor, by its definition, is an
important aspect of any issue before an administrative agency, as it is for
Congress in the first instance to define the appropriate scope of an agency’s
mission.”84 The court went on to note that the absence of any discussion of
such an important factor leaves the court with “no alternative but to conclude

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

See generally Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1813.
See generally id. at 1821.
Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1211.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that [the agency] failed to take into account . . . this statutory limit on its
authority.”85
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C.
Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit reviewed a challenge to a SEC regulation
promulgated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”).86 The
regulation would have allowed an investment company to complete
transactions normally prohibited by the ICA if the company had an
independent chairman and at least 75% of its board was comprised of
independent directors.87 The challenger alleged, inter alia, that the SEC
violated the APA by failing to properly consider the regulation’s effect on
competition, efficiency, and capital formation.88 The D.C. Circuit held that the
SEC had violated the APA because it did not consider an alternative to
requiring an independent chairman and it failed to properly consider the
regulation’s effect on competition, efficiency, and capital formation.89
The SEC found abuses being perpetrated by mutual fund directors during
transactions that involved conflicts of interest.90 To reduce the chances for
such abuse, the SEC amended the “Exemptive Rules” to produce more
independent boards while facilitating beneficial transactions involving
conflicts of interest.91 The SEC reasoned that raising the required percentage of
independent directors to 75% from 50% would “strengthen the independent
directors” control of the fund board and its agenda”92 as well as “help ensure
independent directors carry out their fiduciary responsibilities.”93 The SEC
justified requiring an independent chairman, stating: “[a] fund board is in a
better position to protect the interests of the fund, and to fulfill the board’s
obligations . . . when its chairman does not have the conflicts of interest
inherent in the role of an executive of the fund adviser.”94 Two of the five SEC
Commissioners, concerned that the two conditions would impose “a substantial
cost to fund shareholders” and under the belief that previously existing laws
provided adequate opportunities for control by independent advisers, dissented
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c).
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d at 136.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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from the rule’s adoption.95 The dissenting Commissioners faulted the SEC for
failing to give “real considerations to the costs” of the 75% requirement, for
inadequately justifying the independent chairman requirement, and for not
giving due consideration to alternatives to the independent chairman.96
The D.C. Circuit found that it was required by State Farm, 463 U.S. 29
(1983), to determine whether the SEC “examined the relevant data and
articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”97 The court found
that the SEC acted reasonably when it amended the Exemptive Rules as a
preventative measure, but that the SEC had violated the APA because it did not
properly consider the new rules’ effect on competition, efficiency, and capital
formation.98
The SEC claimed that it was difficult for it to establish the exact costs of
the independent director requirement because it had no reliable way of
determining how regulated funds would satisfy the condition.99 The court held
that such difficulty does not excuse the SEC from “its statutory obligation to
determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule it has
proposed.”100 The court reasoned that, even if the SEC could not establish the
average cost of the conditions because it did not know how many funds would
be effected by the conditions, it could have computed the cost to an individual
fund which would have allowed it to estimate the effect the new Exemptive
Rules would have on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.101 The
court recognized that uncertainty limited what the SEC could do but held that
the uncertainty could not excuse the SEC from apprising “itself – and hence
the public and the Congress – of the economic consequences of a proposed
regulation before it decides whether to adopt the measure.”102 The court found
that the SEC’s failure to consider the costs imposed upon funds by the new
Exemptive Rules was evidence that the SEC did not properly consider the

95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 143–44.
Id.
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conditions’ effect on competition, efficiency, and capital formation.103 As a
result, the court held that the SEC had violated the APA.104
Although a disclosure-based alternative to the independent chairman
condition was endorsed by two dissenting Commissioners, the SEC did not
consider the alternative when it adopted the new Exemptive Rules.105 The
proposal would have required funds to disclose whether it had an independent
or inside chairman.106 The SEC countered the challenge by asserting that
Congress had rejected a “purely disclosure-based approach” under the ICA.107
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC had violated the APA by not
considering the alternative approach.108 The court, reasoning that just because
Congress required a means other than disclosure in some circumstances does
not mean that Congress would not find disclosure an appropriate tool in others,
rejected the SEC’s ICA argument.109 The court also found that the ICA,
contrary to the SEC’s position, required many disclosures.110 Although it
conceded that the SEC was not required to consider every conceivable
alternative, the D.C. Circuit highlighted the facts that two SEC Commissioners
had endorsed the disclosure proposal111 and disclosure was “a familiar tool in
the Commissioner’s toolkit.”112 Therefore, the SEC could not claim that
disclosure was either an unknown or uncommon alternative.113 Because the
SEC failed to give adequate consideration to a significant alternative and did
not properly consider the economic effects of the new Exemptive Rules, the
D.C. Circuit held that the amendments to the Exemptive Rules were arbitrary
and capricious.114
In American Equity Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the
D.C. Circuit reviewed a challenge to a SEC regulation that made fixed indexed
annuities (“FIA”) subject to federal securities laws.115 The regulation, Rule

103
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Id.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 144–45.
Id. at 144–45.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 167.
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151A,116 stated that FIAs were not annuity contracts and thus precluded FIAs
from fitting an exception for annuity contracts within of the Securities Act of
1933 (“Securities Act”).117 The challengers contended that the regulation was
arbitrary and capricious under the APA because the SEC had not properly
considered the rule’s effect on efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.118 The D.C. Circuit held that it was reasonable for the SEC to
interpret “annuity contract” as to exclude FIAs because “annuity contract” was
ambiguous within the Securities Act.119 However, the court ultimately vacated
Rule 151A after finding the SEC’s consideration of the Required Factors
arbitrary and capricious.120
The SEC contended that the challenge to its consideration of the Required
Factors was a non sequitur because the Securities Act did not require it to
undertake a thorough analysis of the rule’s effect on the factors when it
promulgated Rule 151A.121 Although the D.C. Circuit seemed to agree that the
SEC was not required to undertake such an analysis, it rejected the SEC’s
argument.122 The “grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged
are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.”123
Accordingly, Rule 151A was judged based on the analysis the SEC had
conducted when it promulgated the rule.124 In its analysis, the SEC concluded
that that Rule 151A would promote competition by bringing about “clarity in
what has been an uncertain area of law.”125 The court found this reasoning
adequate because the SEC “cannot justify the adoption of a particular rule
based solely on the assertion that the existence of a rule provides greater clarity
to an area that remained unclear in the absence of any rule.”126 The court
explained that “[w]hatever rule the SEC chose to adopt could equally be said to
116

Rule 151A, 17 CFR § 230.151A.
15 U.S.C. § 77a.
118 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 172.
119 Id. at 174.
120 Id. at 179.
121 Id. at 177.
122 Id. (“We must reject the SEC’s argument that no error occurred because the SEC was not required by
the Securities Act to conduct a § 2(b) analysis”). If the D.C. Circuit believed § 2(b) required the SEC to
perform a cost-benefit analysis it likely would have stated “We reject the SEC’s argument because we find that
the Securities Act does require it to conduct such an analysis.” However, because the court did not, and did not
decide the case in such a manner, it is likely that the D.C. Circuit agreed with, or at least found reasonable, the
SEC’s interpretation of §2 (b) of the Securities Act of 1933.
123 Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 87.
124 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 177.
125 Id. at 177–78.
126 Id.
117
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make the previously unregulated market clearer that it would be without that
adoption.”127 The court conceded that resolving the legal status of FIAs might
promote competition, but regarding whether Rule 151A placed FIAs either
inside or outside of the exception within the Securities Act, the SEC would
have clarified this uncertain area of law.128 The D.C. Circuit held that the
Securities Act “required more than this.”129 Section 2(b) of the Securities Act
did not “ask for an analysis of whether any rule would have an effect on
competition [. . .] [r]ather it asks for an analysis of whether the specific rule
will promote [. . .] competition.”130 The D.C. Circuit found that the SEC’s
reasoning did not support the SEC’s conclusion as to the specific effects Rule
151A would have on competition.131
The court also found that the SEC’s analysis failed because the SEC made
no findings as to the level of competition in the marketplace or the level of
investor protection that existed under state law.132 When the SEC considered
Rule 151A’s effect on investor protection, it concluded that the rule would
promote investor protection by extending “the benefits of the disclosure and
sales practice protections of the federal securities laws to FIAs”.133 By
imposing disclosure requirements on FIAs, the SEC believed that Rule 151A
would enable investors to “make more informed investment decisions about
purchasing FIAs.”134 The SEC then concluded that Rule 151A would promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation based on its belief that Rule
151A would promote investor protection.135 The SEC stated that Rule 151A
would promote efficiency by allowing investors to make better decisions.136
The SEC asserted that Rule 151A would promote competition because better
informed investors making better decisions would promote competition among
FIA issuers.137 The SEC stated that Rule 151A would also promote
competition because more broker-dealers would begin selling FIAs if their
regulatory status was more definite.138 Unfortunately for the SEC, it failed to
127
128
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assess the level of competition and investor protection afforded by state law
regulations already in place.139 Additionally, the SEC had not made any
findings as to the level of competition in the marketplace that existed under
state law regulations.140 The court held that the SEC could not logically
conclude that Rule 151A would enhance investor protection or allow investors
to make better informed decisions because it did not know what protections
and disclosure requirements were already in place at the time it promulgated
Rule 151A.141 The SEC’s conclusions as to the economic effects of Rule 151A
were therefore invalid because the SEC had stacked its conclusions as to those
factors on the conclusion that Rule 151A would enhance investor
protection.142As a result, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC’s consideration of
Rule 151A’s effect on competition, efficiency, and capital formation was
arbitrary and capricious under § 706(2)(A) of the APA.143
In Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the D.C
Circuit reviewed a challenge to SEC Rule 14a-11,144 a regulation the SEC
issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act145 of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”). The Dodd-Frank Act
specifically authorized the SEC to promulgate rules that would grant
shareholders access to the director nominating process of publicly held
corporations.146 Rule 14a-11 required companies subject to the SEC to include
the names of board candidates nominated by the shareholders in proxy
materials distributed during a director election.147 The SEC conditioned
shareholders’ use of Rule 14a-11 on the requirements that the shareholder or
group of shareholders must provide notice to the company of its intent to use
Rule 14a-11 and have held a minimum of 3% of the company’s securities
entitled to vote for a minimum of three years prior to the date the shareholder
or group submits notice of its intent to use Rule 14a-11.148 The nominating
shareholder or group must continue to own the voting shares though the date of

139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 177.
Rule 14a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (2011).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376

(2010).
146
147
148

See id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915.
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146.
Id. at 1147.
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the election meeting.149 As justification for Rule 14a-11, the SEC submitted its
conclusion that the rule’s potential costs would be justified by the “potential
benefits of improved board and company performance and shareholder
value.”150 The SEC rejected an alternative that would have let a company’s
board or shareholders choose whether to adopt Rule 14a-11 via corporate
bylaws, stating that “exclusive reliance on private ordering under State law
would not be as effective and efficient” at enabling shareholders to nominate
and elect directors to the board.151 The SEC also rejected a proposal to exclude
investment companies from Rule 14a-11.152 As in Chamber of Commerce, 412
F.3d 133, two Commissioners dissented and voted against the rule.153 The
dissenting Commissioners criticized the SEC for failing to act “on the basis of
empirical data and sound analysis.”154
The challengers argued that the SEC had violated the APA because the
SEC did not adequately “consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.”155 The D.C. Circuit explained that it must
determine whether the SEC had “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d]
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choices made.”156 The court cited Chamber of
Commerce for the proposition that the SEC has a “statutory obligation to
determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule.”157 However,
the D.C. Circuit’s attempt to interpret of the statute’s language is little more
than a restatement of the statute. Less than a paragraph later, the court noted
that the SEC “has a unique obligation to consider the effect of a new rule upon
‘efficiency, competition, and capital formation,’” an observation which merely
rephrases the Amended Standard.158 The court explained that the SEC would
be acting arbitrarily and capriciously if it failed to “apprise itself—and hence
the public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a proposed
regulation.”159
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The SEC anticipated that Rule 14a-11 would reduce shareholder’s costs in
nominating directors because it would reduce printing, postage, and advertising
costs compared to the costs incurred in a “‘traditional’ proxy contest.”160 The
SEC also predicted that Rule 14a-11 would “mitigate collective action and
free-rider concerns,” which might “discourage a shareholder from exercising
his right to nominate a director in a traditional proxy contest”.161 The SEC
concluded that eliminating such concerns would have “the potential of creating
the benefit of improved board performance and enhanced shareholder
value.”162 The Adopting Release for Rule 14a-11 demonstrated that the SEC
also predicted the rule would impose costs on companies and shareholders in
the form of preparation costs for “disclosure, printing and mailing [. . .], and
additional solicitations.”163 The SEC estimated that Rule 14a-11 might also
have adverse effects on company performance such as “distracting
management.”164 Ultimately, the SEC concluded that Rule 14a-11 would
advance the “efficiency of the economy on the whole,” and the rule’s costs
would be justified by its benefits.165 The SEC reasoned that although boards
might be motivated to “expend significant resources to challenge shareholder
director nominees”, directors may find that their fiduciary duties prevent them
from “using corporate funds to resist [. . .] for no good-faith purpose”.166 The
SEC believed that boards may therefore just include the shareholder-nominated
board candidates in the proxy materials.167 The SEC also stated that the
ownership and holding period thresholds would “limit the number of
shareholder director nominations.”168 Strangely, the SEC did not estimate the
costs that companies opposing shareholder nominees would incur from
solicitation and campaigning.169
The D.C. Circuit found the SEC’s assertion that directors might not choose
to oppose candidates nominated by shareholders “had no basis beyond mere
speculation.”170 The court found that the SEC had presented no findings that
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“such a forbearance is ever seen in practice.”171 Moreover, the American Bar
Association explained in a comment to the SEC that “the board will be
compelled by its fiduciary duty to make an appropriate effort to oppose the
nominee” if the board finds the shareholder nominee to be an inferior
candidate.172 The conditions for using Rule 14a-11 were only “reason[s] to
expect election contests to be infrequent; it says nothing about the amount a
company will spend [. . .] when there is a contested election.”173 Even though
empirical evidence of the costs was “readily available” to the SEC, it failed to
estimate the possible costs of the rule to companies.174 The SEC did not claim
estimating those costs was impossible, possibly because it had access to
estimates that had purportedly already computed the costs.175 The D.C. Circuit
cited the SEC’s failure to “make tough choices about which of the competing
estimates is most plausible, [or] to hazard a guess as to which is correct,” as
support for holding that the SEC had “neglected its statutory obligation to
assess the economic consequences of its rule.”176
The record did not support the SEC’s conclusion regarding Rule 14a-11
improving board performance and increasing shareholder value.177 The SEC
discounted studies submitted by commentators and relied exclusively on
studies that were not highly relevant and which produced results even the SEC
questioned.178 The court found the empirical evidence in the record was
“mixed” at best.179 Accordingly, the court held that the SEC had not supported
a logical connection between its findings and its conclusion that increasing the
chance of electing shareholder nominees would enhance company performance
and shareholder value.180 Similarly, the court regarded the SEC’s failure to
give serious consideration to the possibility that costs “could be imposed [. . .]
from use of the rule by shareholders representing special interests,” as
evidence that the SEC acted arbitrarily.181 The court found the SEC also acted
arbitrarily when it weighed the costs and benefits of Rule 14a-11 because it did
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not assess to what extent the rule would replace traditional proxy contests.182
The SEC was therefore without a way to determine whether Rule 14a-11
would produce the net benefit that it claimed the rule would.183
The D.C Circuit found the SEC’s framing of the costs and benefits to
shareholders to be especially arbitrary because the SEC’s reasoning was
“internally inconsistent.”184 The SEC predicted that the savings shareholders
would receive from a reduction in costs would “remove a disincentive for
shareholders to submit their own director nominations” and therefore
encourage election contests.185 For support, the SEC cited comment letters
stating that the frequency of election contests might be high.186 However, when
estimating the costs imposed by Rule 14a-11, the SEC concluded that the
threshold requirements would limit use of the rule.187 Because the SEC
assumed a high frequency of use when it estimated the benefits of the rule but
a low frequency of use when it estimated the costs of the rule, its reasoning
was “internally inconsistent.”188
Finally, because Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious on its face,” the
court held that it was invalid as applied to investment companies.189 The court
found that investment companies are subject to different requirements that
provide shareholder protections not applicable to publicly traded companies.190
Although the SEC acknowledged the protections, it neither considered whether
these protections reduced the benefit to be had from applying Rule 14a-11 to
investment companies nor assessed the costs Rule 14a-11 would impose on
investment companies by upsetting their unique governance structures.191 The
court characterized the SEC’s justification for applying the rule to investment
companies as “tantamount to saying the saving grace of the rule is that it will
not entail costs if it’s not used, or at least not used successfully to elect a
director.”192
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B. The D.C. Circuit Applied the Proper Standard of Review
The critics’ argument that the D.C. Circuit has usurped the SEC’s
rulemaking power is primarily based on the flawed assumption that the D.C.
Circuit forced the SEC to perform a CBA.193 Critics also argue that the D.C.
Circuit applied an inappropriately thorough standard of review to the SEC’s
reasoning.194 However, the D.C. Circuit did not require the SEC to perform a
CBA and it applied the Proper Standard of Review.195 If the SEC performs a
CBA and submits it as justification for promulgating a rule, then the rule will
have to stand or fall based on the CBA.196
Critics properly cite Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d 133, and Business
Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144, as cases where the SEC may have justified its rule
with reasoning not required by Congress.197 Critics are also correct to highlight
the SEC’s strange behavior in Chamber of Commerce. In Part VIII of the
adoption release reviewed in Chamber of Commerce, the SEC thoroughly
analyzed the effects the rule would have on the Required Factors.198 In Part VI
of the release, the SEC estimated the costs and benefits of the rule.199
Remarkably, the SEC relied not on Part VIII, but on Part VI.200 Although the
court could have viewed the strange reliance to be evidence that the SEC had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the standard imposed by the ambiguous
statute was the SEC’s to interpret.201 Because the Amended Standard could
reasonably be interpreted to require a cost-benefit analysis,202 the court was
likely apprehensive to find reliance on such an analysis to be arbitrary and
capricious. On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit might have read the Amended
Standard to require the SEC to submit a CBA. After all, the D.C. Circuit has
consistently regarded the SEC’s submission of a CBA as evidence that the

193 See generally Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1828 (arguing that “the D.C. Circuit’s opinions
repeatedly call for cost-benefit analysis”).
194 See generally id. (arguing that the D.C. Circuit has developed a new, inappropriate, review standard).
195 See generally Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d 1209 (the agency failed to properly consider a required factor);
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166 (the court evaluated the SEC’s conclusions that its rule would
provide certain benefits); Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d 133 (the SEC offered a costbenefit analysis and the court evaluated it); Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (the SEC offered a cost-benefit
analysis and the court evaluated it).
196 See Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 87.
197 Id. at 1831.
198 Id. at 1831–32.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45.
202 See supra Part III.
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SEC considered the Required Factors.203 It is also entirely possible that the
court believed the SEC interpreted the Amended Standard to require a CBA
and found that interpretation to be reasonable. On balance, it is unlikely that
the D.C. Circuit interpreted the Amended Standard to require the SEC to
perform a CBA because the court has accepted both CBAs and general
economic conclusions as evidence that the SEC considered the Required
Factors.204
Critics cite American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (“Donovan”), 452 U.S.
490 (1981), for the narrow presumption that “Congress uses specific language
when intending that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis.”205 They
interpret Donovan to stand for the principle that, absent “clear verbiage”
conveying Congress’s intent, a reviewing court may not force an agency to
engage in cost-benefit analysis.206 Regardless of the fact that Chevron, 467
U.S. 837, and other post-Donovan precedent may have weakened such a
conclusion, the Critics’ argument is immaterial where the agency chooses on
its own to conduct a CBA.207 Furthermore, the Critics’ argument does not
account for when an agency reasonably, but possibly erroneously, interprets its
enabling statute to require it to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and attempts to
satisfy the self-imposed standard.208
In an attempt to weaken the precedential strength of Chamber of
Commerce, 412 F.3d 133, Critics argue that the decision in Chamber of
Commerce is not in line with State Farm, 463 U.S. 29.209 They argue that in
State Farm the Court simply held that “the agency failed to provide a reasoned
basis through the use of cost-benefit analysis” whereas the D.C. Circuit in
Chamber of Commerce “expressly held that the cost-benefit approach
203 See generally Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166 (rather than holding that the SEC had failed
entirely to meet the Amended Standard, the court evaluated the SEC’s conclusions as to the economic effects
of its proposed rule); Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d 133 (rather than holding that the
SEC had failed entirely to meet the Amended Standard, the court evaluated the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis);
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (the court evaluated the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis).
204 Compare Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166 (the court evaluated the SEC’s conclusions that
its rule would provide certain benefits), with Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d 133 (the
SEC offered a cost-benefit analysis and the court evaluated it), and Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (the SEC
offered a cost-benefit analysis and the court evaluated it).
205 Am. Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510–11 (1981).
206 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1829.
207 See Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 87 (the “grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged
are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based”).
208 See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (an agency is afforded a high level of deference when it
interprets its enabling statute).
209 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1832.

LIND GALLEYSFINAL

192

4/20/2016 10:59 AM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol. 3

underlaid the Review Standard.”210 Had the D.C. Circuit done so in Chamber
of Commerce, the Critics might be correct. However, in Chamber of
Commerce the D.C. Circuit merely held that the cost-benefit analysis the SEC
used to justify its rule was incomplete.211 Consequently, Chamber of
Commerce comports with State Farm. A court must resolve a challenge to
agency action based on the reasoning the agency submitted at the time it
performed the challenged action.212 If a CBA formed even part of the SEC’s
justification for adopting a rule, State Farm requires the reviewing court to
consider the CBA when judging the validity of the rule.213 Not only did the
SEC perform a CBA as part of adopting the rule at issue in Chamber of
Commerce, but it also explicitly relied on the CBA in the adopting release.214
The D.C. Circuit was therefore following State Farm when it analyzed the
CBA submitted by the SEC.215 Yet, as Critics are correct to point out, the SEC
could have limited the scope of judicial review and stood on much better
ground had it not relied on the CBA.216 Chamber of Commerce is also similar
to State Farm in that the SEC’s failure to consider “a familiar tool in the
Commission’s tool kit” is similar to the NHTSA’s failure to consider an
airbag-only option.217
In another attempt to weaken the precedent relied on by the D.C. Circuit,
Critics argue that Public Citizen, 374 F.3d 1209, was used inappropriately by
the D.C. Circuit in the cases at issue.218 Public Citizen forms the basis for
Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005), which in turn was
heavily relied on in Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153 (D.C. Cir.
2011), and American Equity, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).219 Critics
210

Id.
See Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d at 143.
212 See Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 95.
213 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (holding that a reviewing court must determine whether
the agency based its decision on a consideration the relevant factors and articulated a logical explanation for its
decision).
214 See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg.
46,378, 46,386–87, 46,388–89 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (using a cost-benefit analysis to
justify the rule); see also Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d at 144.
215 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (requiring a reviewing court to determine whether the
agency articulated “rational connection between the facts found and the decision made”).
216 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1832.
217 Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 51(“an alternative within the ambit of the existing
standard”), with Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d at 144 (“a familiar tool in the
Commission’s toolkit”).
218 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 3 at 1826–28.
219 Compare Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d 1209 (finding that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously
because it failed entirely to consider a required factor), and Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412
211
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endeavor to distinguish Public Citizen from Chamber of Commerce on the
grounds that the review standards imposed by the statutes in the cases were
different.220 However, the APA is not statute-specific.221 The differences
between the statutes at issue in Public Citizen and Chamber of Commerce were
irrelevant when the D.C. Circuit cited Public Citizen for the principle that a
rule is arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to consider the factors its
organic statute requires it to consider.222 Critics also argue that the D.C. Circuit
inappropriately relied on Public Citizen because the agency in that case failed
entirely to consider a required factor whereas in Chamber of Commerce, 412
F.3d 133, the SEC made an attempt to consider each factor.223 This difference
in effort is inconsequential. If anything, the effort differential only supports the
obvious conclusion that it is easier for a court to hold that an agency action is
arbitrary and capricious when an agency failed entirely to consider a factor
than when it incompletely considers a factor. Indeed, where a court finds an
attempt to consider every factor it must determine whether that attempt was
adequate but where a court finds that an agency failed entirely to consider a
factor it can end its inquiry there.
Although Critics cite the D.C. Circuit’s use of the verb “determine” rather
than “consider” in Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d 133, as evidence of the
court going against Congress, the court’s subsequent use of “determine”
suggests the court was not imposing a higher standard upon the SEC than
Congress required.224 The D.C. Circuit explained in Business Roundtable, 647
F.3d 1144, that the SEC “has a unique obligation to consider the effect of a
new rule upon ‘efficiency, competition, and capital formation.’”225 The fear
that the D.C. Circuit’s use of “determine” established a higher standard of
review than “consider” might require is undermined by the court’s note in
Chamber of Commerce stating that all it would require from the SEC is a guess
F.3d 133 (relying on Pub. Citizen to find that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to
properly consider the Required Factors), with Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166 (relying on Chamber
of Commerce to find that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to properly consider the
Required Factors), and Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (relying on Chamber of Commerce to find that the
SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to properly consider the Required Factors).
220 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1826–28.
221 See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 79 P.L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (applying to agencies
unless Congress legislates otherwise).
222 Compare Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d 1209 (the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to
consider a required factor), with Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d 133 (the agency acted
arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to adequately consider required factors).
223 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1826–28.
224 Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d at 143.
225 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 115, 1148.
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as to which is estimate is correct.226 If using “determine” and “consider”
interchangeably suggests anything other than that they are synonyms in
common parlance, it is that the D.C. Circuit found the Amended Standard to be
ambiguous. Although the D.C. Circuit could have been more careful with its
choice in words, it did not attempt to interpret the ambiguity stemming from
the verb “consider.”227 Regardless, the SEC precluded the court from reaching
this issue in the cases because it submitted a CBA for each rule challenged.228
The substance of the court’s review suggests that the D.C. Circuit found the
Amended Standard to be ambiguous on its face and thus deferred to the SEC’s
interpretation of what the Amended Standard required of it.229 If the court
deferred, and the court’s actions are proof that it did, it likely took the SEC’s
repeated submissions of CBAs as an indication that the SEC interpreted the
Amended Standard to require it to perform such analyses.230
The Critics favorably state that American Equity, 613 F.3d 166, may be the
closest the D.C. Circuit has come to administering the Proper Standard of
Review because in American Equity the court did not focus on “costs and
benefits”.231 However, this is not evidence of a different review standard or the
court restricting itself.232 The reason the court did not analyze costs and
benefits in deciding the case was because the SEC did not justify the rule at
issue with a CBA.233 Instead, the SEC came the closest here to using Chevron
Deference by making legal conclusions about the rule’s effects on the Required
Factors.234 Critics claim that American Equity is on better footing than the
other D.C. Circuit cases because it “better adhered to the hard-look standards
from State Farm and . . . the APA.”235 It is interesting then that Critics seek to
undermine American Equity. Critics attempt to differentiate American Equity
from State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, on the grounds that the statute in State Farm
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See Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d at 143.
See id. (the court restated the Amended Standard as it appeared in the NSMIA without attempting to
interpret the language for itself).
228 See Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 87 (the “grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged
are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based”).
229 See generally Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d 133 (evaluating the justification
the SEC provided without questioning if the Amended Standard required such an analysis).
230 Id.
231 Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1829.
232 See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 177 (the SEC justified its ruling by simply concluding as
to its effects on the factors without resorting a CBA).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1829–30.
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“specified the universe of data [the agency] must consider.”236 Critics again
miss the mark. Both the statute at issue in State Farm and the statute at issue in
American Equity required the respective agencies to consider relevant
factors.237 In both American Equity and in State Farm, the agencies lost by
failing to adequately consider the relevant factors.238 Just because the statute in
State Farm specified the data that the agency must consider in addition to the
factors does not differentiate that case from American Equity.
Contrary to the Critics’ view, Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144, did not
require the SEC to perform a CBA or require the CBA to yield a net benefit. 239
The court examined the SEC’s CBA because the agency relied on it to support
its conclusion that Rule 14a-11 provided a net benefit.240 If the SEC interprets
the statute to require it to conduct a CBA and accordingly submits a CBA as
part of its justification for promulgating a rule, State Farm commands the
reviewing court to analyze the CBA.241 Similarly, if the SEC does not interpret
the statute to require it to perform a CBA but does one anyway, the reviewing
court will analyze the CBA.242 In Business Roundtable the court did not require
the SEC to conclude that a rule would produce a net benefit.243 Nevertheless,
the SEC justified promulgating Rule 14a-11 by concluding that the rule
produced a net benefit.244 As a result, State Farm required the D.C. Circuit to
ensure that the SEC articulated a logical connection between its findings and
its conclusion that Rule 14a-11 produced a net benefit.245 The SEC therefore
suffered defeat not as a result of the D.C. Circuit usurping its rulemaking
power, but because the SEC could not support its conclusions.
The Critics consider it “anomalous” that a large portion of the opinion in
Business Roundtable involved the SEC’s inability to justify shareholder access

236
237

Id.
Compare Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 172, with Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at

33.
238 Compare Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 177–78 (holding only that “the SEC must defend
its analysis before the court upon the basis it employed in adopting that analysis”), with Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 46.
239 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148 (the SEC concluded that the benefits of the rule at issue could
outweigh the costs of the rule).
240 Id.
241 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
242 Id.
243 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148 (evaluating the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis because the SEC
justified promulgating the rule at issue with the CBA).
244 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153.
245 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43.
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to the nominating process because Congress “took the big policy issue, proxy
access, off the table.”246 Here again, the Critics’ narrow focus on the statutes at
issue in the cases caused them to miss the Proper Standard of Review. The
reason the court did not concentrate on the specific conditions was because the
petitioner did not challenge the conditions.247 The challenger established the
scope of review when it contended that the decision to require shareholder
access was arbitrary and capricious in light of the SEC’s findings.248 It is not
the D.C. Circuit’s responsibility to provide the challenger an argument
different than the one advanced. The Dodd-Frank Act stated that the SEC “may
include” a requirement in its rules that shareholders be given access to the
nominating process.249 The words “may include” suggest Congress recognized
that shareholder access might not be appropriate in all circumstances. Congress
left the decision to the SEC as to which circumstances, if any, necessitate
shareholder access.250 Consequently, State Farm required the SEC to establish
a logical connection between its findings and its decision to exercise its
discretion to require shareholder access.251
On the whole, the Critics’ assertion that the D.C. Circuit’s decisions have
“invited a judicially contrived mandate for the SEC to rigorously set forth the
case that the perceived benefits exceed the estimated costs”252 entirely misses
the court’s reasoning in the above cases. The D.C. Circuit did not hold that the
challenged rules were arbitrary and capricious because they failed to produce a
net benefit.253 The court held that the rules were arbitrary and capricious
because the SEC failed to support its conclusions as to the rules’ respective
effects.254 The court has only required that the SEC articulate a logical
connection between its findings and its actions.255
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Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1836.
See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146 (“The petitioners argue the [SEC] promulgated the rule in
violation of the [APA] because . . . the [SEC] failed adequately to consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency,
competition, and capital formation”).
248 See id.
249 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915.
250 See generally id.
251 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43.
252 Cox & Baucom, supra note 3, at 1834.
253 See generally Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d 1209; Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166; Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, 412 F.3d 133; Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144.
254 Id.
255 Id.
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CONCLUSION
With the Amended Standard, Congress created an ambiguous review
standard open to interpretation by the SEC.256 Under a Chevron Analysis the
SEC has the authority to control the scope of judicial review by offering a
reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous language.257 Regardless of whether
the statute specifically requires the SEC to perform a thorough cost-benefit
analysis, and it most likely does not, the SEC continually submitted CBAs as
justifications for its rules.258 The Critics argue that the D.C. Circuit should
“accord the regulatory agency deference on such indefinite, speculative, and
arcane considerations, since judicial review of such a matter is beyond the
court’s core competency.”259 Judicial deference based on agency expertise is
warranted when an agency applies its expertise to technical issues. However,
an agency should not escape review where it fails to apply its expertise simply
because it finds its task to be problematic. Furthermore, while reviewing
technical aspects of agency actions may be beyond a court’s core competency,
determining whether an agency articulated a “rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made” is not.260
As a final matter, the SEC’s inability to use Chevron Deference to control
the scope of judicial review counsels against granting it any special latitude.261
If the SEC conducts a CBA and relies upon it for justification of an action, the
court must analyze it.262 The D.C. Circuit’s opinions may encourage the SEC
to assert its agency authority by retreating to legal conclusions which are at
best no better than its inadequate empirical conclusions.263 Yet, that result does

256

See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.
258 See generally Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166; Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
412 F.3d 133; Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144.
259 Id.
260 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43.
261 See generally Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166; Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
412 F.3d 133; Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (in each case, the SEC failed to structure its arguments to
activate Chevron Deference).
262 See Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 87 (the “grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged
are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based”).
263 See supra Part IV.
257
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not make the decisions any less correct. After all, the judiciary’s role is “to say
what the law is,” not what it should be.264
FORREST E. LIND III*

264 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is”).
* Emory University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2017; Executive Articles Editor, Emory Corporate
Governance and Accountability Review; Technology Track Legal Counsel, TI:GER (Technological Innovation
Generating Economic Results); President, Emory Law Federalist Society; Mentor, Student Bar Association;
B.A. Criminology cum laude, University of Florida. I would like to thank Nicole Fukuoka, Richa Khanna, and
Wei Wang for the substantial amount of time they contributed to helping me complete this work. Their efforts
are a testament to the quality of the Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review. I am also
thankful to Professor Alexander “Sasha” Volokh for instilling in me the passion for administrative law that
fueled this piece.

